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Sense of agency and mentalizing: Dissociation of subdomains of
social cognition in patients with schizophrenia
Abstract
The sense of agency, i.e., the sense that “I am the one who is causing an action”, and mentalizing, the
ability to understand the mental states of other individuals, are key domains of social cognition. It has
been hypothesized that an intact sense of agency is an important precondition for higher-level
mentalizing abilities. A substantial body of evidence shows that both processes rely on similar brain
areas and are severely impaired in schizophrenia, suggesting a close link between agency and
mentalizing. Yet this relationship has not been explicitly tested. We investigated 40 individuals with
schizophrenia and 40 healthy controls on an agency and mentalizing task. On the agency task,
participants carried out simple mouse movements and judged the partially manipulated visual feedback
as either self- or other-generated. On the mentalizing task, participants inferred mental states from
pictures that depicted others' eyes (“Reading the mind in the eyes test”). Neuropsychological,
psychopathological and social functioning levels were also evaluated. Both sense of agency and
mentalizing were impaired in schizophrenia patients compared to healthy controls. However, testing for
a relationship revealed no significant correlations between the two processes, either in the schizophrenia
or the control group. The present findings demonstrate a dissociation of agency and mentalizing deficits
in schizophrenia, suggesting that the multifaceted construct of social cognition consists of independent
subdomains in healthy and psychiatrically ill individuals.
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Abstract 
The sense of agency, i.e., the sense that “I am the one who is causing an action”, and mentalizing, the 
ability to understand the mental states of other individuals, are key domains of social cognition. It has 
been hypothesized that an intact sense of agency is an important precondition for higher-level 
mentalizing abilities. A substantial body of evidence shows that both processes rely on similar brain 
areas and are severely impaired in schizophrenia, suggesting a close link between agency and 
mentalizing. Yet this relationship has not been explicitly tested. We investigated 40 individuals with 
schizophrenia and 40 healthy controls on an agency and mentalizing task. On the agency task, 
participants carried out simple mouse movements and judged the partially manipulated visual 
feedback as either self or other generated. On the mentalizing task, participants inferred mental states 
from pictures that depicted others’ eyes (“Reading the Mind in the Eyes test”). Neuropsychological, 
psychopathological and social functioning levels were also evaluated.  
Both sense of agency and mentalizing were impaired in schizophrenics compared to healthy controls. 
However, testing for a relationship revealed no significant correlations between the two processes, 
either in the schizophrenia or the control group.  
The present findings demonstrate a dissociation of agency and mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia, 
suggesting that the multifaceted construct of social cognition consists of independent subdomains in 
healthy and psychiatrically ill individuals. 
 
Key words: sense of agency, mentalizing, self-other distinction, action monitoring, theory of mind, 
perspective taking 
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1. Introduction 
Disturbed social cognition, defined as the  “perception, cognitive processing and interpretation of 
social information” (Penn et al., 1997) is regarded by many psychiatrists as a main feature of 
schizophrenia, resulting in impaired social skills and social alienation (Penn, et al., 1997, Brüne, 2005, 
Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Two core processes of social cognition have been intensely studied in 
patients with schizophrenia: “mentalizing” (also referred to as “theory of mind”) and “sense of 
agency” (Gallagher, 2000). 
Sense of agency or “self-other distinction” is defined as the sense or identification of oneself as the 
agent of one’s own actions. It enables the distinction between actions generated by oneself from those 
generated by others, and determines the feeling of being the author of an action (Gallagher, 2000, 
David et al., 2008b, Jeannerod, 2009). Experiments on the sense of agency are primarily 
philosophically or clinically motivated. Patients with schizophrenia may exhibit a specific group of 
symptoms, so-called first-rank symptoms, which include passivity symptoms such as thought insertion 
or delusions of control (Blakemore et al., 2002). Patients with these symptoms experience others’ 
actions as a consequence of their own intentions or attribute their own actions to external sources. 
Several authors have explained such delusions as a breakdown of the sense of agency (Frith, 1988, 
Frith and Done, 1989, Frith, 1992, Blakemore, et al., 2002). However, schizophrenia patients without 
first-rank symptoms also show sense of agency impairments, albeit to a lesser degree (Daprati et al., 
1997, Franck et al., 2001).  
The ability to attribute mental states to oneself and other people, mentalizing (or “theory of mind”), 
allows person  to understand, manipulate and predict behaviour (Frith and Corcoran, 1996). 
Schizophrenia patients show significant and stable mentalizing impairments as demonstrated in 
numerous studies (Harrington et al., 2005, Sprong et al., 2007, Bora et al., 2009).  
Mentalizing is commonly thought to be a complex social-cognitive process that depends on the 
development of several precursor mechanisms (Frith and Frith, 1999, Stone and Gerrans, 2006). 
Amongst other social-cognitive processes such as joint attention, gaze monitoring and the detection of 
animacy or intentional movements, the sense of agency has also been considered an important 
precursor to mentalizing (Bischof-Köhler, 1994, Abu-Akel, 2003, Decety and Chaminade, 2003), 
necessary to avoid confusion about one’s own and another person’s beliefs or feelings. More 
specifically, when someone demonstrates deficits in understanding another person’s false beliefs, – 
before understanding that this person’s belief is false – he first has to recognize and evaluate his own 
belief and understand that the other person may have a belief different from his own (Flavell, 1977, 
Flavell, 1999). This idea is supported by evidence from clinical populations in which both processes 
are subject to impairments, such as in schizophrenia. Moreover, in self- rating questionnaires, 
schizophrenia patients indicate lower levels of perspective taking compared to controls, but higher 
levels of personal distress when confronted with emotions of other people (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 
2007, Fujiwara et al., 2008, Derntl et al., 2009, Haker and Rössler, 2009). This could be explained by 
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impairments in the self-other distinction, and hence a disturbed sense of agency, which could hinder 
the appropriate understanding of another individual’s perspective. This leads us to ask: are deficits in 
mentalizing a mere epi-phenomenon of an inability to differentiate or disengage from other people’s 
mental states? What is the exact nature of the relationship between sense of agency and mentalizing?  
Although the self-other distinction seems fundamental to mentalizing, there is evidence suggesting 
that they represent two independent processes. Van Hooren et al. (2008) investigated the association 
between a range of social-cognitive processes, finding a lack of overlap between a sense of agency and 
mentalizing, and more broadly, between all the social-cognitive processes investigated. More 
specifically, David et al. (2008) assessed the two processes in individuals with high-functioning 
autism and Asperger’s Syndrome (HFA/ AS), which is characterized by prominent deficits in social 
cognition and interaction. They showed a dissociation between impaired mentalizing but an intact 
sense of agency in autism. In addition, evidence from functional imaging studies also suggests 
neurobiological dissociation or independence: David et al. (2006) for example reported that sense of 
agency and mentalizing, despite being assessed with the same stimulus material, showed no 
interaction at the neural level. In conclusion, it remains unclear whether these two processes represent 
two independent domains of social cognition or whether they can be conceptualized as interrelated 
processes. In order to further elucidate the exact nature of the relationship between the self-other 
distinction ability and mentalizing, and to reconcile results on dissociation between the two processes, 
we sought to study them in conjunction in both healthy and psychiatrically ill participants in whom 
impairments in both sense of agency and mentalizing processes have been shown. More specifically, 
we first assessed whether or not a relation between both processes could be detected by applying a 
widely used mentalizing test (“Reading the mind in the eyes test”) and an established agency 
manipulation task (David et al., 2007, David et al., 2008a) in a sample of schizophrenia patients and a 
healthy control group. Deficits in both tasks or correlated task performance in the clinical population, 
would strongly indicate a close relationship between sense of agency and mentalizing. Second, we 
aimed at assessing the influence of cognitive variables and levels of social functioning on sense of 
agency and mentalizing by using a comprehensive neuropsychological battery and a social functioning 
questionnaire (SDI), in order to reveal other variables suggesting a common functional basis. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
We recruited 40 patients (28 men, 12 women) who fulfilled the ICD-10 criteria for a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia and were in full or partial remission (ICD-10 F20.x4/x5) from the outpatient service of 
the Psychiatric University Hospital Zurich (N=35) and an inpatient ward of a Teaching Hospital of the 
University of Zurich, the “Sanatorium Kilchberg” (N=5). Of these 40 patients, 17 were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia of the paranoid type, 2 of the hebephrenic type and 21 of the undifferentiated type. 
Symptoms were rated on the day of testing by two trained psychologists using the German version of 
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the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay et al., 1987) A total of 33 out of 40 patients 
received antipsychotic medicine: mean chlorpromazine equivalents (CPZe) = 410.8 (SD = 360.3); 
CPZe for second generation antipsychotics were calculated following Woods (Woods, 2003). We 
assessed the presence of first-rank-symptoms with the German version of the “ego-disturbance scale” 
from the “Working Group on Methodology and Documentation in psychiatry” instrument (AMDP) 
(Fähndrich and Renfordt, 1985, Stieglitz and Fähndrich, 1988) containing the items: thought 
broadcasting, thought withdrawal, thought insertion, derealization, depersonalization, other symptoms 
of alien control. Each item was scored from 0-4, for a max. score of 24 in total. In addition, 40 healthy 
control participants (23 men, 17 women) were recruited on the University of Zurich campus (N=15), 
in adult education facilities (N=20) and among hospital staff (N=5).  
Exclusion criteria for both groups included history of a traumatic brain injury or a neurological illness, 
the presence of  a developmental disorder, cognitive impairment, habitual alcohol or drug abuse, 
vision reduction, lack of fluency in the German language and age less than 20 or over 55 years. 
Control participants with a history of psychiatric illness were excluded. Handedness (Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory, Oldfield, 1971) and familiarity with computers (i.e., the number of hours per 
day spent at a computer) were assessed for each subject. Written informed consent was obtained from 
all participants. The study was approved by the local ethical committee and conducted in accordance 
with the guidelines of the Helsinki Declaration. 
 
2.2. Materials and procedure 
2.2.1. The agency task  
The present task can be considered an established agency manipulation task closely based on previous 
agency paradigms (Fourneret et al., 2001, Franck, et al., 2001, David, et al., 2007, David, et al., 
2008a). Participants were seated in front of a computer screen to perform simple right-handed mouse 
movements towards a white object (i.e., an asterisk) which appeared either on the upper left or right 
side of the black screen. The movements were visible to the participants in form of a cursor. The 
cursor movement or visual feedback matched the participants’ executed movement only in 50 % of the 
trials (real feedback: RF). In the other 50 % a randomly selected movement from a previous trial of the 
subject was replayed (false feedback: FF); (for more details on the task, see David et al., 2007, 2008a). 
The cover story was that on several trials they would not see their own movements, but the 
experimenters’ movements who performed the task in the next room. False movements could differ in 
onset, pace and path deviations. After each trial, the words “self” and “other” appeared on the screen. 
Participants were told to indicate whether they were the agent of the observed movement (self) or not 
(other) by pressing the corresponding button. Thus, a 2 x 2 design with the first factor feedback (real 
vs. false feedback) and the second factor evaluation (self vs. other) was employed (see Figure 1). The 
task was administered on a DELL Optiplex 755 computer (1680 x 1050 resolution), using Presentation 
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software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA, USA). Prior to the experiment, participants 
practiced the task to get used to the trial procedure. The paradigm consisted of 200 trials, of which 100 
were RF and 100 were FF (50 trials to the left and 50 to the right target). The task was conducted in 
three short runs of approximately eight minutes. 
After the experiment, participants completed a debriefing questionnaire in which they had to indicate 
(1) the cues (temporal, spatial or both) they had used to differentiate real and false feedback, (2) how 
fast they had detected the false feedback and (3) how difficult they found the task. 
2.2.2. Mentalizing task 
Mentalizing ability was assessed with the “Reading the mind in the eyes test” (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001), which is aimed at assessing first-order mentalizing abilities. The test consists of 36 pictures 
showing expressive pairs of male or female eyes. Each picture is presented with four choices of 
adjectives. Participants are asked to choose the adjective that best describes the mental state of the 
person (i.e., as expressed by his/ her eyes). A global accuracy score according to Baron-Cohen et al. 
(2001) ranging from 0 to 36 was computed.  
2.2.3. Neuropsychological assessment 
All participants completed a neuropsychological battery which tapped into executive functions (Trail- 
Making Test, Parts A and B (Reitan, 1955) (TMT-A /B), verbal intelligence (Multiple Choice 
Vocabulary Test) (Lehrl, 2005), concentration and attention (d2) (Brickenkamp, 1994), selective 
attention and cognitive flexibility (Victoria Stroop Test) (Regard, 1981), word fluency 
(Aschenbrenner, 2000) and working memory (digit span, Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Adults) 
(Wechsler, 1997).  
2.2.4. Social dysfunction index (SDI) 
The SDI (Munroe-Blum et al., 1996) is a questionnaire consisting of nine scales to assess social 
functioning with respect to nine aspects: public self, independent living, occupational functioning, 
family relationships, important relationships other than family, community leisure recreation, 
acceptance and adherence to health regimens, communication, locus of control. The overall 
dysfunction is calculated as a percentage of total possible score. 
 
2.3. Statistical analysis 
All statistical analyses were performed using the software SPSS 16 for Windows. Level of 
significance was set at p < 0.05 for two-tailed testing. Normal distribution of the data was verified by 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. To investigate significant differences between patient and control 
group, a one-way ANOVA was applied to dependent variables, given that the normality assumption 
was met; group differences on non-normally distributed data were analyzed using the non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U-Test.  
7 
 
The performance on the sense of agency task was analyzed by computing an accuracy score - the 
sensitivity index - by subtracting the number of the correct judgments from the number of incorrect 
judgments. The sensitivity index reflects the participants’ ability to differentiate congruent movements 
from incongruent movements. The reaction times on self-other judgments were also computed to 
compare the speed with which participants decided whether a movement was judged as “self” or 
“other”. Additional dependent variables were the motion onset times of the movement. To investigate 
the potential relationship between sense of agency and mentalizing, Spearman correlation analysis was 
performed. The influence of socio-demographic and clinical variables on both the sense of agency and 
mentalizing performance was computed using Spearman correlation.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Demographic and clinical sample characteristics 
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the 80 eligible participants are shown in Table 1.The 
group of schizophrenia participants contained a significantly higher proportion of males (67.5%) 
compared to the control group (55 %) (Chi2= 5.0, p <0.05). The schizophrenic participants were also 
significantly less well educated than the control group (F= 8.7, p<0.05). There were no significant 
differences between groups concerning age, handedness or familiarity with computers. With respect to 
psychopathology, 10 participants with a subscore > 3 (mean score =7.1 ± 1.9) on the ego-disturbance 
scale were classified as having first-rank symptoms. This patient group showed a significantly higher 
PANSS positive score (mean score =18.0 ± 3.1) than patients without first-rank symptoms (mean 
score =14.6 ± 2.1) (F= 8.1, p <0.01). 
 
3.2. Results on experimental task  
Participants with schizophrenia performed worse on the agency-task compared to healthy control 
participants. They made significantly more mistakes in judging the visual feedback correctly as self- 
or other-generated, as indicated by the Sensitivity Index (F= 4.8, p< 0.05) (Table 2). A closer look at 
the number of errors made per condition between patient and control group revealed that 
schizophrenia patients more often identified false feedback as self-generated (U=471, p=0.68, n.s.) 
and significantly less often as other-generated (U=444, p< 0.05). Patients with and without first-rank 
symptoms did not differ significantly with respect to any of these variables. A comparison of the 
rating times for the self-other judgment revealed that the patient group took significantly longer for the 
ratings (all U < 431, all p< 0.05). They also started significantly later with the cursor movement, 
compared with the control group (all U < 309.5, all p< 0.05) (see Table 2). In a debriefing 
questionnaire participants indicated that they recognized false feedback through temporal and spatial 
path deviations. Of the control participants, 15.5 % reported recognizing false feedback trials by 
temporal deviations (compared with 22.5 % of the patient group), while 37.5 % had used spatial 
deviations (35 % of the patient group) and another 47 % had used both cues (42.5 % of the patient 
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group). There were no significant differences with regards to how fast participants (1 = very early to 5 
= very late) (mean score = 3.2 ± 1.0) and control participants (mean score = 3.0 ± 1.0) recognized 
false-feedback, and how difficult they found the task (1 = very easy to 5 = very difficult) 
(schizophrenia patients: 2,7 ± 1.0; controls: 2.7 ± 0.9). 
 
3.3. Results on mentalizing task and correlation with agency 
In the “Reading the mind in the eyes test”, the patient group identified significantly fewer mental 
states correctly than did healthy controls (F = 13.1, p < 0.05) (Table 2). Correlations between sense of 
agency and mentalizing were tested using Spearman correlation for each group as well as the different 
diagnostic subgroups. No significant correlations between the dependent variables of the agency and 
mentalizing tasks were found (all r< 0.02 all p> 0.05). 
 
3.4. Results of the neuropsychological assessment  
All results are displayed in Table 2. Schizophrenia patients performed significantly worse on measures 
of executive functioning (TMTA /B) and verbal intelligence (MWTB), as well as on measures of 
concentration and attention (d2). They also showed a significantly poorer performance on measures of 
selective attention and cognitive flexibility (Stroop Test), working memory (digit span) and word 
fluency (verbal fluency test). The two groups did not differ significantly in verbal IQ, as indicated by 
MWTB-scores. 
 
3.5. Influence of neuropsychological, demographic, social dysfunction and clinical variables on sense 
of agency and mentalizing 
In the schizophrenia group, the accuracy on the agency task was not influenced by any 
neuropsychological, demographic or social dysfunction variables. Speed of movement, (i.e. movement 
onset times) were positively correlated with executive functions (i.e. performance on the TMT test), 
age and level of social functioning. TMT-A was positively correlated with three motion onset 
conditions ( all r > .39, all p < 0.05), whereas TMT-B was positively correlated with two motion onset 
conditions (all r > .33, all p < 0.05, see Table 3). Concerning age, older participants started later with 
cursor movement in the RS (r = .34, p< 0.05) and FS condition (r=.33, p < 0.05).  
Motion onset times were also positively correlated with the following SDI subscales: occupational 
functioning, important relationships other than family, community functioning, leisure recreation and 
overall SDI score (Table 3). 
No significant influences of neuropsychological performance or demographic variables were found in 
the control group (all r < 0.02, all p > 0.05).  
Clinical variables, especially medication (CPZE), had no influence on test performance regarding 
speed and accuracy in the agency and mentalizing tasks (all r < 0.02, all p> 0.05).  
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Neuropsychological, demographic, social functioning and clinical variables had no significant 
influence on mentalizing. 
 
4. Discussion 
We investigated two core processes of social cognition, namely the sense of agency and mentalizing, 
as well as their possible interrelationship in schizophrenia. Our results demonstrated an impairment of 
both processes, but no significant relation between mentalizing deficits and abnormalities in the sense 
of agency. The patient group also showed significant impairments in all neuropsychological tests and 
lower levels of social functioning. Neither neuropsychological and social functioning variables nor age 
had any influence on performance accuracy in the mentalizing and sense of agency tasks, but did 
influence the speed of movements in the agency task. 
4.1. Sense of agency deficits in schizophrenia 
In the agency paradigm schizophrenia patients made significantly more mistakes in correctly 
identifying the movements than the control group (as indicated by the sensitivity index). This result 
was independent of executive functions, attention, concentration, working memory and cognitive 
flexibility. Although it is clear that explicit agency judgments naturally imply some degree of 
cognitive effort (i.e. “was it me or you?”), our data nevertheless indicate that sense of agency 
impairments constitute an additional deficit, which is present in schizophrenia patients with as well as 
without first-rank symptoms.  
Interestingly, the patient group was not affected in identifying their own movements as self-generated. 
All errors with respect to the awareness and attribution of agency were committed in one direction; 
that is, the schizophrenia patients attributed non-congruent visual feedback as self-generated (i.e. over-
attribution). Clinical observations reveal that schizophrenia is associated with both over-attributions 
(other-to-self-direction) as well as under-attributions (self-to-other direction). This is also reflected in 
the schizophrenia literature with respect to speech attribution (Johns et al., 2001, Johns et al., 2006, 
Stephane et al., 2009) and also with respect to incorrect agency attribution either to external sources or 
to the self (Daprati, et al., 1997, Fourneret, et al., 2001, Franck, et al., 2001). In the majority of agency 
manipulation studies schizophrenia patients showed a tendency similar to that in our study, namely, a 
tendency to attribute what they see to their own agency, despite visual discrepancies (Daprati, et al., 
1997, Fourneret, et al., 2001, Franck, et al., 2001, Haggard et al., 2003, Synofzik et al., 2008). In this 
regard, we could not detect any difference in attribution style between schizophrenia patients with- and 
without first-rank symptoms. To date, the mechanisms accounting for the direction of attribution style 
remain to be revealed. It is possible that cognitive factors (Rössler and Lackus, 1986), recent life 
experiences (Bentall et al., 1991, Blackwood et al., 2001) and paradigm characteristics (van den Bos 
and Jeannerod, 2002) also play a role, in addition to the specific symptoms of schizophrenia. 
In contrast to previous studies, we did not detect differences in agency attribution between subjects 
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with- and without first-rank symptoms (Frith and Done, 1989, Daprati, et al., 1997, Franck, et al., 
2001) Several factors could account for this lack of effect: First, our patients were only mildly 
symptomatic at the time of testing, with possibly only minor agency attribution deficits (see Spence et 
al., 1997 for longitudinal data). Second, we cannot rule out that our paradigm was not sensitive enough 
to detect subtle or very specific differences between the two patient groups. Specific impairments in 
relation to first-rank symptoms were mostly found in tasks employing three or more experimental 
conditions. For example, Franck et al. (2001) used three conditions, employing either no, angular-
spatial or temporal biases between movements and feedback. They showed that patients with first-rank 
symptoms showed specific impairments only in the angular bias condition. Unfortunately, we 
employed dynamic simultaneous spatial and temporal deviations, thus not permitting specific fine-
grained conclusions. 
 Schizophrenia patients were also impaired in other aspects of the task, namely in reaction times for 
judgments of agency, and also in motion onset times (i.e. they were slower in initiating the 
movement). Motion onset times were negatively correlated with TMT-A/B (as a measure of executive 
functioning, specifically psychomotoric speed and visual attention), age and level of social 
functioning. These results point to a well-known motor speed deficit in schizophrenia. The deficit was 
more pronounced in older participants with lower executive functions and a lower level of social 
functioning, especially in the domains of work, social relationships, community functioning and 
leisure recreation (Kopp and Rist, 1994, Fourneret, et al., 2001). 
4.2. Mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia 
In our study, all schizophrenia patients showed significant impairments in first-order mentalizing 
processes. Similar results have been reported previously (Sprong, et al., 2007, Bora, et al., 2009). 
Since their first description as hallmark features in schizophrenia (Frith, 1992), mentalizing deficits 
can be found in the acute and remitted phase of the disorder (Inoue et al., 2006, Mo et al., 2008) , in 
first episode psychosis (Bertrand et al., 2007), schizotypy (Pickup, 2006) and in relatives of 
schizophrenia patients (Janssen et al., 2003).  
4.3. The relationship between mentalizing and sense of agency in schizophrenia 
Our main objective was the examination of the relationship between the sense of agency and 
mentalizing in schizophrenia. Although the schizophrenia patients had significant deficits in both 
processes, these were not related, suggesting that they represent two distinct areas of disturbance in 
schizophrenia. Previously, it had been hypothesized that the sense of agency is an important precursor 
for mentalizing processes, crucial for the avoidance of emotional distress and the confusion of feelings 
of self and other. This hypothesis has been supported so far only by indirect evidence from 
simultaneous impairments of both processes in clinical disorders such as schizophrenia (Blakemore, et 
al., 2002). However, only few studies have directly investigated the relation between these two social-
cognitive processes. Van Hooren et al. (2008), in a factor analysis, found no overlap between these 
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processes among other social-cognitive processes. David et al. (2006) investigated self-other 
distinction and mentalizing in a functional imaging study, but found no interaction of the two 
processes on a neural level. More readily comparable to our own study, David et al. (2008) 
investigated sense of agency and mentalizing processes in HFA/AS. They found a dissociation 
between both processes. A direct comparison of the two studies reveals that individuals with autism 
(David et al., 2008) were faster in psychomotor speed in the TMT-A compared to the present patients 
with schizophrenia, but showed stronger mentalizing deficits in the Eyes test compared to the 
schizophrenia patients. With respect to agency, HFA/AS were not impaired in the attribution of 
movements as self or other (sensitivity index) but needed a longer time for agency judgments (as 
indexed by longer rating reaction times). However, differences in psychopathology and the 
methodological design make it difficult to draw conclusions from their study. In fact HFA/AS and 
schizophrenia are clinically distinct disorders that show only little overlap in their symptoms and 
underlying deficits. For example, in autism, mentalizing processes seem to be diminished or absent, 
probably because of the onset of HFA/AS in early infancy. By contrast, schizophrenia is a disorder 
that has its onset in mid- to late adolescence, and mentalizing processes are relatively unimpaired until 
the onset of the illness. After the onset, in general, mentalizing is atypical or excessive 
(hypermentalizing) rather than absent. Similarly, sense of agency processes are not impaired in the 
same way in both disorders (Frith and Done, 1989, Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000), with an intact sense 
of agency in HFA/ AS (Russell and Hill, 2001, Sebanz et al., 2005, Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006, 
David, et al., 2008a) and a disturbed sense of agency in schizophrenia (Malenka et al., 1986, Frith and 
Done, 1989, Knoblich et al., 2004). Moreover the task requirements differed slightly (e.g., one vs. two 
target objects) and different experimental settings were used (not the same location, different PC and 
joystick/ mouse). In addition, the samples differed in age, gender, and IQ (David, et al., 2008a). 
An alternative explanation for our finding of a dissociation might be that mentalizing encompasses a 
social-cognitive and a social-perceptual component, and the sense of agency might be an important 
precursor for the social-cognitive component in particular (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000) 
Neuroimaging data show that mentalizing is related to increasing activity in the prefrontal cortex 
(especially the medial aspect thereof), superior temporal regions and (to some extent) the amygdala 
(Abu-Akel, 2003, Frith and Frith, 2003, Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs, 2006). Prefrontal regions are mainly 
related to the social-cognitive aspect of mentalizing, while the amygdala und superior temporal cortex 
are linked to the social-perceptual aspect (Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan, 2000). However, it can be 
assumed that the Eyes test used in our study is a measure of both the perceptual and the cognitive 
component of mentalizing through the attribution of complex mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997, 
Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001, Shur et al., 2008). In line with this claim, two neuroimaging studies have 
shown the activation of temporal regions, prefrontal cortex, medial frontal lobe and the amygdala 
during test performance, confirming that both aspects of mentalizing are involved (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1999, Russell et al., 2000). By contrast, in schizophrenia, a hypo-activation in several brain regions, 
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especially in the left inferior frontal gyrus (Russell, et al., 2000) and right posterior orbital cortex 
(Brunet et al., 2003) during the performance of the Eyes-test has been shown. Regarding the sense of 
agency, an abnormal hyper-activation of the IPL, the brain area critical for distinguishing internally 
produced actions from those generated by others (Decety et al., 2002, Farrer et al., 2004, Decety and 
Lamm, 2006, Schnell et al., 2007) has been found in schizophrenia, especially in patients with first-
rank symptoms (Spence et al., 1997, Farrer, et al., 2004). Regarding the interaction between the sense 
of agency and mentalizing, it has been speculated that, since schizophrenia patients show impairments 
in both processes  on a physiological level, the functional connectivity between the IPL and prefrontal 
areas, may also be impaired (Frith et al., 2000). This could perhaps explain why we could not detect a 
relationship between the two processes on a behavioral level. Neuroimaging studies that 
systematically investigate the interaction of social-cognitive processes in schizophrenia are needed to 
address this specific question.  
 
Limitations 
First, the patient sample was slightly biased, possibly not allowing for population inferences, as it 
consisted of a majority of male individuals with average illness duration of 12.5 years. However, this 
can be considered a sample composition typical for schizophrenia, since more male patients participate 
in clinical studies than female patients. Secondly, schizophrenia patients were less educated (in years) 
compared to the control participants, but this difference is not likely to explain differences on, for 
example, the agency task, especially because there were no significant correlations between education 
level and sense of agency variables. Third, it is possible that the setup of the sense of agency task used 
in our study may have been too abstract and as such was not clearly associated with mentalizing 
processes. It has been emphasized that the sense of agency is especially relevant in emotionally 
stressful situations i.e. where the subject interacts with another person and has to distinguish self- and 
other feelings in order to react properly. In our sense of agency task, the participants interacted with a 
computer, and no evocation of emotional distress was involved. An experiment which investigates 
both aspects of social cognition in a more naturalistic setup involving interaction with another agent 
might be needed to gain more insight into the relationship between the sense of agency and 
mentalizing (Davis, 1996). Support for this idea can be found in studies of self-rated mentalizing 
abilities in schizophrenia (Montag et al., 2007, Derntl, et al., 2009, Haker and Rössler, 2009), where 
patients with schizophrenia indicate low levels of mentalizing but high levels of personal distress 
compared to healthy controls, which indicates a relationship between self-other distinction and 
mentalizing. However, our agency task was based on previously used paradigms (e.g. also 
manipulating visual feedback on a computer screen) and can be considered a reliable indicator of sense 
of agency processes (Fourneret, et al., 2001, Franck, et al., 2001, Farrer, et al., 2004). It could even be 
traced back to the seminal work conducted by Nielsen (Nielsen, 1963),  who had subjects draw a line 
on a piece of paper. They could either see their own hand tracing the line or, unbeknownst to them, the 
13 
 
experimenter’s hand, whose movements spatially deviated from the subject’s own movement. That is, 
when the line drawn by the experimenter veered to one side (similar to our task), Nielsen’s subjects 
adjusted their own line-drawing, suggesting they were not aware of the manipulation. Additionally, 
our task has been previously applied in combination with fMRI and TMS in healthy participants and in 
a patient group with HFA / AS, demonstrating the recruitment of brain areas relevant to the sense of 
agency, such as the IPL (David et al., 2006, David, et al., 2007).  
Conclusion 
Our findings can be interpreted as indicating a dissociation of sense of agency and mentalizing in 
schizophrenia. Social cognition in general is a complex construct that involves several low- and high-
level processes and multiple interacting structures (Adolphs, 2001, van Hooren et al., 2008).  Our 
findings suggest that sense of agency and mentalizing represent two non-overlapping subdomains 
which independently contribute to the multifaceted construct of social cognition in schizophrenia. 
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Variable Schizophrenia patient group 
(N=40) 
M ± SD (MD) 
Healthy control group 
(N=40) 
M ± SD (MD) 
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Sex (male / female)a 28 /12 22 / 16 
Age (years) 38.0 ± 9.8 34.4 ± 9.7 
Education (years)b 12.5 ± 1.7 13.9 ± 2.1 
EDI score for handednessc 87.5 ± 40.5 (100) 88.10 ± 37.3 (100) 
Duration of Illness 12.5 ± 9.0  
Number of hospitalizations 3.3 ± 4.5  
Age of Onset (years) 26.53 ± 6.5  
PANSS Positive Score 10.8 ± 3.4  
PANSS Negative score 17.8 ± 7.7  
PANSS General Score 24.4 ± 5.5  
PANSS Total Score 53.0 ± 14.1  
Hours at the computer per day 2.2 ± 2.0 3.0 ± 1.8 
 
Table 1. Clinical and sociodemographic sample characteristics, PANSS Positive and Negative Syndrom 
(PANSS) scores, M = mean, SD = standard deviation, MD = median 
a
 Chi2= 5.0, p < 0.05 
b ANOVA, F = 8.7, p < 0.05 
c Raw score, not standardized 
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Dependent variables 
of the Agency Task, 
Results on 
Neuropsychological 
Tests and 
Mentalizing Task 
Schizophrenia patient 
group (N=40)  
M ± SD (MD) 
Healthy control group 
(N=39) 
M ± SD (MD) 
Statistics p 
Sensitivity Index (%) 73,0 ± 6,7 76,9 ± 8,2 F= 4,9 (p< 0.05) 
Motion Onset RS 658.1 ± 182.8 (618.3) 546.2 ± 129.4 (532) U= 460 (p< 0.01) 
Motion Onset RO 673.7 ± 277.3 (605.8) 537.9 ± 135.1 (559) U= 309.5 (p< 0.05) 
Motion Onset FS 618.2 ± 227.9 (554.7) 496.7 ± 99.0 (468,2) U= 597 (p< 0.05) 
Motion Onset FO 640.4 ± 192.4 (605.9) 525.9 ± 121.8 (518) U= 416   (p< 0.01) 
RT on RS judgments 1211.4 ± 816.2 (1051) 718.8 ± 268.0 (647.5) U= 431 (p< 0.01) 
RT on RO judgments 2071.2 ± 1092.4 (1814.3) 1557.5 ± 965.3 (1543.1) U= 337 (p< 0.05) 
RT on FS judgments 1376.9 ± 951.5 (1129.3) 1086.3 ± 620.4 (867.7) U= 597 (p< 0.05) 
RT on FO judgments 1649.7 ± 1650.4 (1268.2) 1111.0 ± 496.0 (1039.8) U= 454.5 (p< 0.05) 
TMT-A 36.4 ± 12.1 (32) 25.58 ± 11.2 (22) U= 346 (p< 0.01) 
TMT-B 85.3 ± 31.4 (84.5) 54.2 ± 17.1 (52) U= 262,5 (p< 0.01) 
DS-V 8.7 ± 2.3 (8) 10.6 ± 2.1 (11) U= 394 (p< 0.01) 
DS-R 5.4 ± 1.5 (5) 7.4 ± 2.6 (6.4) U= 424 (p< 0.01) 
d2 ( % score) 6.2 ± 6.9 (4) 3.4 ± 3.0 (2.6) U= 570 (p < 0.01) 
Stroop Test 1.8 ± 0.4 (1.9) 1.6 ± 0.5 (1.6) U= 478 (p < 0.05) 
Fluency Test 29.9 ± 7.4 (27.5) 36.7 ± 10.4 (35) U=  301 (p> 0.01) 
MWTB-Test 28.4 ± 4.1 (29.8) 31.0 ± 0.5 (32) U= 467,5 (p< 0.05) 
IQ-Scores 108.9 ± 13.9 115.7 ± 24.9 F= 2.2 (n.s.) 
Reading the mind in 
the eyes test 
23.1 ± 3.2 
 
25.5 ± 2.6 
 
F = 13.1 (p < 0.05) 
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Table 2. Results of the agency task and the neuropsychological tasks for the schizophrenia group (N=40) and 
the control group (N=40) 
 M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation,  MD = Median, RS real feedback judged as self-generated, RO real 
feedback judged as other-generated, FS false feedback judged as self-generated, FO false feedback judged as 
other-generated 
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 RS Onset 
Motion 
FS Onset 
Motion 
FO Onset 
Motion 
R0 Onset 
Motion 
TMT-A 0.291 
p = 0.07 
0.400 * 
p < 0.05 
0.533 ** 
p < 0.01 
0.413 * 
p< 0.05 
TMT-B 0.291 
p = 0.07 
0.340 * 
p < 0.05 
0.390 * 
p < 0.05 
0.140 
p= 0.39 
SDI 3 0.376** 
p< 0.05 
0.24** 
p< 0.05 
0.341** 
p< 0.05 
0.254 * 
p< 0.05 
SDI 5 0.244 * 
p< 0.05 
0.324 ** 
p< 0.05 
0.274 
p< 0.05 
0.009 
p= 0.955 
SDI 6 0.045 
p= 0.78 
0.245* 
p< 0.05 
0.094 
p= 0.56 
-0.114 
p = 0.56 
SDI 9 0.253* 
p< 0. 05 
0.326 ** 
p< 0.05 
0.249 * 
p< 0.05 
 
-0.064 
p= 0.69 
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